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Corporeal Gods, with reference to Plato and Aristotle  
 
(1) The aim of this paper is to explore the idea of corporeal gods as it appears in the 
cosmologies of Plato and Aristotle. We know from experience that in order to explore an idea 
in any detail we often have to sympathise with it to some extent, or  ‘enter into it’. Fortunately, 
this attitude does not require us to endorse the idea in propria persona: it is a stance of the 
imagination. However, even imagination sinks back from the effort of ‘getting inside’ an idea 
which it regards as straightforwardly and obviously incoherent. Consequently, whoever  
undertakes to  explore the idea of corporeal gods (whether they are Plato’s gods or Aristotle’s 
or someone else’s) has already silenced any automatic tendency to reject this notion as  
nonsense or a contradiction in terms. Likewise for any similar tendency to reject the idea of a 
god that came into being through a cause other than itself. We sometimes find these reflexes at 
work in contemporary debates on theism, where both sides - theists and sceptics – proceed as 
if it is analytically true that anything correctly called ‘god’ is incorporeal and the First Cause. 
But these are not universal reflexes: their source (for our culture) is biblical monotheism. 
 
(2) The well-known contrast between god as ‘transcendent’ and god as ‘immanent’ is also not 
very helpful for our present discussion. In the context of theology, ‘transcendent’ means 
transcendent in relation to everything material and physical. Given the contrast with 
‘immanent’, it might then seem that the idea of a corporeal god is the idea of a divinity 
immanent in physical matter. But an immanent god is not a corporeal god in the sense that 
concerns us here. A corporeal god is a god which ‘has’ its body just as each human being ‘has’ 
her or his body. The verb ‘has’ is misleading, of course: in saying that human beings ‘have’ 
bodies we only mean to indicate that our bodies are not all that we have. In other words, we 
stop short of saying that the human being is his body because this sounds like an identity-
statement. For we want also to be able to say that the human being is his mind or his soul, 
where by ‘mind’ or ‘soul’ we indicate something different from what we indicate by ‘body’. 
The situation as it presents itself to common sense is that the human being (a) is not identical 
either with his mind or with his body, but (b) equally does not have a mind or have a body in 
the way in which he has a computer or a house. Rather, the human being is constituted of 
mind and body. And so it is with a corporeal god: such a god is constituted of body and soul. 
Hence the god itself is visible if its body is visible, just as we see a human person in terms of 
her corporeal presence. The point is particularly obvious in the case of Plato’s cosmic god in 
the Timaeus. The Demiourgos is shown in separate stages making the cosmic body and 
making the cosmic soul, but only when he joins this soul to this body has the new god – the 
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cosmic god – come to be.1 This god is not immanent in the cosmic body, for the language of 
immanence is the language of location: it implies that the immanent god is present in the 
host-body without being constituted by it. Thus a god immanent in a body is necessarily an 
incorporeal god,2 even if this god necessarily dwells in the body in question and cannot exist 
in any other way. Consequently, although the immanent god is in some sense present to us 
through the host-body, the immanent god is not a possible object of our sense-perception. We 
may think that the natural world exists just as the manifestation of a single immanent god, 
but in such a picture, it seems to me, the god is still understood as in some sense ‘behind’ the 
natural world, whereas according to corporealist monotheism the natural world is itself 
divine because it is the body of divinity. 
 
(3) We should place our topic of Plato’s and Aristotle’s corporeal gods in relation to some 
pantheist possibilities. There are many varieties of these. A view like the one ascribed to 
Thales suggests a pluralistic pantheism: there are many, perhaps indefinitely many, gods, and 
they are everywhere in the natural world. Then there is monolithic pantheism such as that of 
Spinoza, whereby the one god is everywhere since the one god and the one nature are 
identical. A pantheism may be immanentist or corporealist – that is, it may hold that a every 
part of nature is a host-location to one or more gods, or it may hold that the entire expanse of 
nature is the body of a single corporeal god, or it may hold that the entire expanse of nature is 
made up of the bodies of a plurality of corporeal gods.  
 
(4) But now let us notice a major difference between all these pantheisms and the kind of 
view we get in Plato and Aristotle. In Plato and Aristotle some parts of the natural universe 
are, very definitely, not divine (even though on Plato’s account their kinds originally came 
into being in accordance with a divine intelligible ordering), while other parts are corporeal 
gods. These are all equally parts of the natural world: they all have their own physical nature 
and their own characteristic type of visible motion. Moreover, if we focus for a moment on 
Plato, not only the body and visible motion but also the soul and psychic activity of the main 
corporeal god are very clearly parts of nature: they belong in the subject-matter of natural 
science, being in this respect no different from the physiology and psychology of non-divine 
animals. 
 
                                                            
1 Timaeus  reference 
2 If a corporeal god were immanent in a body, the god’s body and the host-body would be in the same 
place at once. 
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(5) This in my view is the aspect of Plato’s and Aristotle’s corporeal gods3 that is most alien 
from our modern perspective. According to these philosophers, the corporeal gods are only 
parts of nature,  not the whole of it, and therefore the study of them is meant to unfold 
alongside the study of other, non-divine, parts of the very same world of nature. The study in 
each case constitutes a branch of natural science. Consideration of the corporeal gods is not 
left to religion, poetry, or unscientific myth-making, but is part of natural science just as much 
as the consideration of mortal animals and plants and the basic inanimate elements and 
chemical compounds are parts of natural science. This is not altered by the fact that, certainly 
in Plato and perhaps at times in Aristotle, there is a religious tone to their approach to the 
corporeal divinities. But the discourse in which they make this approach is of the same 
general kind as the physicist brings to bear on any parts of the natural world, including the 
messy and perishable parts which very definitely fall short of being divine. Because, for these 
philosophers, the physical world includes both divine beings and non-divine beings, their 
views are not pantheistic. The world includes both divine and non-divine beings because 
otherwise it would be incomplete.4 Correspondingly, the study of nature as nature is 
incomplete unless it tries to give accounts of both these principal kinds.5 These scientific 
accounts will sometimes make theoretical comparisons and contrasts between these kinds, 
just as science may compare and contrast the structures and behaviours of birds and 
mammals or of copper and tin.6 And scientific methodological reflection will sometimes focus 
on the comparative difficulties and advantages of pursuing these two   branches of science.7 
All this may seem very strange to us, since for us comparisons and contrasts with god are 
usually either made just in ethical terms, or else they are comparisons between the infinity of 
god and the finitude of everything else. The ethical type of comparison with god is important 
too for Plato, and perhaps also for Aristotle,8 but its bearing is perhaps more practical than 
theoretical. As for the finite versus the infinite  - well, these philosophers’ corporeal gods have 
very few infinite attributes. 
 
(6) To prevent misunderstanding, I must say a few words about Plato’s main cosmic god, or 
the divine living being as it is often called. This god is in a sense the whole cosmos – but only in 
one sense. It is the whole insofar as all corporeal matter and all corporeal creatures are 
                                                            
3 The use of this phrase in connection with Aristotle will be discussed briefly below. 
4 References, Plato, Aristotle. 
5 References, Plato, Aristotle. 
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contained spatially within it. It contains other corporeal gods besides itself: notably the sun, 
moon, planets and stars. These gods have their own bodies and their own motions (rotation 
on their own axes)9 even though they also share in – because they are moved round by – the 
motions of the great god’s soul. All living beings, i.e. the great cosmic god itself, the astral 
gods, and the mortal animals along with the plants, are constituted out of the same basic four 
elements: fire, earth, air, and water. They are also all constituted in accordance with the same 
eternal and intelligible paradigm.10 So all these beings have a common origin, and in a sense 
divinity is everywhere – since  everything either is the great cosmic god or has its existence 
within the great cosmic god. But this is very far from being a pantheistic system, since it 
contains living beings that are not divine and whose lives have a measure of independence 
from the cosmic god. Mortal animals – which for Plato means primarily human animals - 
depend for their existence on the larger cosmic environment. But their bodies are not just 
parts of the body of the cosmic god. Their bodies are, of course, mereological parts of the 
totality of the physical, and (as has already been said) the inorganic materials of their bodies 
are portions of all the fire, water, earth, and air that exist. But the mortal bodies considered as 
the bodies of living beings are not parts of the cosmic god’s body when it too is considered as 
the body of a living being. That is to say: the bodies of mortal animals are not organic parts of 
the cosmic god’s body in the way in which organs and limbs are parts of an animal’s body. 
The cosmic god does not need the mortal animals to exist inside it in order for it to function 
effectively as the kind of living being that it is. A perfect sphere, it has no external limbs or 
organs of locomotion and perception, nor internal organs of metabolism, for there is nowhere 
beyond itself to go, nothing beyond itself to perceive, and it has no need of external food 
which must then be processed within. All that this god has to do is rotate for ever in 
accordance with the astronomical motions of its soul; and it would seem that its soul-motions 
are completely expressed in these cosmic rotations. Thus the lives and existences of the 
mortal creatures add nothing to the life of the cosmic god itself when we consider this, as 
Plato’s language invites us to do, as the life of a divine animal. However, let us also consider 
the cosmic god from the point of view of the Demiourgos, whose perspective governs much 
of the exposition of the Timaean cosmology. The Demiourgos, we are told, who set about 
constructing the cosmic god because: ‘being free of jealousy he wanted to make everything as 
much like himself as possible … the god [i.e. the Demiourgos] wanted everything to be good 
and nothing to be bad as far as that was possible’ (Timaeus 29e -30a). To fulfill this 
comprehensive aim it was not enough to make a perfect – and hence divine – living being, for 
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when this was done the sum total of physical reality was still incomplete until the production 
of mortal creatures was added as a further task.11 
 
(7) I have just been pointing out (against a possible pantheistic interpretation of Plato’s cosmic 
god) that even though the world considered as the sum total of physical reality would have 
been incomplete without mortal animals, the cosmic god itself, that greatest immortal and 
divine animal, is complete as a living system all on its own, independently of the lives of the 
mortal animals. I shall now point out that, according to Plato’s picture, the lives of the mortal 
animals are not just parts or expressions of the one life of the cosmic god. Just as our organic 
bodies are not organic parts of its body, so the soul in us, which is a complex thing, is very far 
from being part of the cosmic soul. Plato makes this clear in his detailed account of the 
coming to be of the soul of the human animal. This process has several stages. First, after 
having constructed the cosmic god, both body and soul, the Demiourgos, in a new and 
separate stage of cosmopoiesis, constructs the rational souls of mortals. He makes them of 
ingredients similar to those that went into the cosmic soul, but these ingredients are very 
clearly presented as numerically different from anything that was used for the cosmic soul.12 
These rational souls, destined for mortal bodies, are then taken over by the demiurgic 
ancillary gods who have the task of constructing the mortal beings. (This is because the 
Demiourgos himself cannot make anything that is not immortal.) The anciullaries make the 
mortal bodies, and, as part of the same task, they make the lower parts of the mortal animal’s 
soul, the parts that are necessary for creatures that have to live in an environment and which 
need to feed, reproduce, and operate in society.13 By this narrative Plato shows very carefully 
that the human soul in all its aspects is neither part of the cosmic soul nor is somehow 
breathed into us by or from the already existing cosmic soul. 
 
(8) I may seem to have strayed from the main topic of corporeal gods, but the aim in this part of 
the paper has been to show (especially in connection with Plato’s Timaeus, where 
misunderstanding might arise) that corporeal gods in Plato and Aristotle are not by any 
means pantheistic, but are proper parts of the natural domain whose other proper parts are 
corporeal non-gods. One of the implications of this, as has already been emphasized, is that 
an important part of natural science – serious, epistemically responsible natural science – 
takes divine beings as its subject-matter. In Plato’s case (it is less clear for Aristotle) this 
means that the right-minded scientist takes a religious as well as an intellectual risk in 
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building hypotheses about the natural world. For the account of the cosmos is largely, 
although not wholly, going to be an account of the life, body, soul, and workings, of a god, 
and when one names and describes a god it is an offence against the divinity to do it so 
lightly or without much caring whether one speaks the truth – even though in the nature of 
the case it may be very difficult to know what the truth could be. Thus Plato at the beginning 
of the Critias, which concludes Timaeus’s cosmology, has Timaeus pray to the cosmic god to 
preserve whatever he has said correctly in the preceding discourse, and where he has made a 
mistake to correct him by giving him better understanding.14 Although it is not clear exactly 
how the cosmic god itself is to be the source of further illumination, this passage envisages 
further scientific discovery developing through a kind of partnership with the cosmic god. 
Perhaps Timaeus is not far away from the Kantian metaphor of interrogating nature, 
although the method in this case would almost certainly not be experimental. Many scholars 
have pointed out that Timaeus’s account of the coming to be of the cosmos is a theogony that 
self-consciously and deliberately places itself in the tradition going back to Hesiod. When 
Plato has Timaeus call the cosmology an eikōs muthos15 he may very well be alluding to that 
tradition. It should also, however, be emphasised that the Timaean theogony also constitutes a 
set of serious and intentionally corrigible scientific proposals about the world of nature as it is 
today.16 From our modern point of view such a combining of physics and theology is a 
strange thing, and even more strange (still from our point of view) is the fact that Plato 
evidently senses no strain or tension in this combination, nor even the appearance of strain or 
tension. The calmness of his approach in this respect, as if it is a perfectly natural and 
obviously rational approach, testifies to the naturalness, for Plato and his early readers, of the 
idea of corporeal gods. 
 
(9) Broadly, the same can also be said about Aristotle, to whom I now turn. However, there 
are also well-known reasons for caution here. Clearly, if Aristotle admits corporeal gods at all 
into his system, those gods in their corporeal aspect will be none other than the heavenly 
bodies: either the visible heavenly bodies or (more likely) the non-visible, but nonetheless 
physical, spheres in which the visible ones are set. But unlike Plato, who in the Timaeus 
applies the term theos freely to the great cosmic animal and to the sun, moon, planets, and 
                                                            
14 Ref. Note also that the Demiourgos is NOT addressed in prayer (cf. Cornford). Ref. also language at 
Tim.28b. 
15 Reference 
16 On to eikos as a standard to be aimed at, see M. Burnyeat [ref. Rhizai  paper]; S. Broadie, Nature and 
Divinity in Plato’s Timaeus, ch. 2. 
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stars,17  Aristotle never, I believe, uses it directly of the heavenly bodies or of the celestial 
system considered as a whole.  Instead, he regularly speaks of these bodies as theia.18 This is of 
course the weaker term, since it can apply to things which are certainly not gods: for instance, 
Aristotle says that there is something theion about the nature of bees.19 The question then in 
relation to the celestial bodies is whether in calling them theia Aristotle is deliberately denying 
them the full status of gods, or whether his usage has a different explanation.20 I think that 
there is a different explanation, based on the fact that theios, being an adjective, admits of a 
comparative. Aristotle often applies the explicit comparative to the celestial beings, and to the 
matter of their bodies.21 But I think he has reason to be always (i.e. silently as well as 
sometimes explicitly) thinking of them in a comparative way. This is because of their place in 
his universe. 
 
(10) In explaining this, the first point to make is that according to the theory of Metaphysics 
Lambda, movement of the celestial spheres is due to their focus on the Prime Mover (an 
incorporeal being) as object of love. That is to say: there is a being on which they depend for 
their movement (which is also their life), and this being, as first cause, is more entitled than 
they to the title theos. Even if they are gods they are physically subordinate, and this is 
perhaps more compactly conveyed by calling them ‘divine’ (theia), with its possibility of 
‘more and less’, than by the full statement that although they are gods they are dependent on 
a causally higher god. It is important to see that this Aristotelian  situation is very different 
from the one in the Timaean cosmology. There, the great created cosmic god has a sort of 
physical independence from any superior god. The cosmic god of course owes its genesis to 
the Demiourgos - including the genesis of the soul by which it now moves. But in the account 
as Plato actually gives it (which, as we know, Aristotle interpreted literally22) the Demiourgos 
plays no part in keeping the cosmos going once it has been constructed. In fact, when his 
direct part of the construction-work is over, it is said that he ‘took up his abode in his 
customary attitude’ (42e5-6), which seems to mean that he withdrew from constructive 
activity but maintained his characteristic benevolence towards the cosmos.It is true that the 
cosmic god would cease to exist if it ceased to please its maker;23 but this is clearly a 
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counterfactual conditional. The point is that as things actually are now in the having-been-
constructed universe of the Timaeus, the great cosmic god lives and moves entirely from the 
power of its own soul. Hence once we consider the physical world as fully now in existence, 
there is no need (and indeed no place) for directly explaining its current operations by 
reference to the unembodied mind of the maker. It runs as it does not because he is making it 
run (in any sense of ‘making’), but because he has made it to be the kind of thing that, once 
made, runs of itself. That is why having made it he could retire. All this being so, the great 
cosmic god of the Timaeus is actually the ultimate god when it comes to directly explaining 
why the physical universe runs as it does today. By contrast, Aristotle’s world is everlasting in 
both temporal directions. Consequently, if there has ever has been any need of an incorporeal 
archē of celestial motion, then there always has been, there always will be, and therefore at 
every moment there is, such a need. We cannot, as in the Timaean account understood 
literally, relegate the incorporeal archē to the position of having only been actively relevant 
before the cosmos had come to exist in its full splendour of body and soul. Although the 
Aristotelian Prime Mover is beyond the domain of physics, the domain of physics is currently 
and immediately dependent on it in a way in which the cosmos of the Timaeus is not now 
currently dependent on its non-physical maker. Thus from the point of view of Aristotelian 
physical science today, even the outermost celestial sphere is not the ultimate divine archē. 
 
(11) Here is the second main point in this explanation of Aristotle’s comparative notion of the 
divinity of the spheres. Not only are these spheres on a lower rung of divinity as compared to 
the Prime Mover: they are also constituted of a simple corporeal material that is more divine 
than the four sublunary simple bodies. It is a material of a fundamentally different and 
superior type. In Aristotle’s system this is deduced from the difference between the circular 
pattern of natural celestial motion and the natural motions of the sublunary elements which 
are rectilinear each to its own region. The greater nobility of circular motion, which goes with 
its unique suitability to be an everlasting unbroken motion, implies the greater nobility of the 
fifth type of body itself. The same conclusion flows from the necessary everlastingness of the 
motion: the type of body whose motion is necessarily everlasting must be indestructible, 
unfaltering, ageless etc. And the motion itself must be perfectly effortless.24 In all this too we 
see is a big divergence from the Timaeus.  Just as Aristotle departs radically from Timaean 
system by making his world everlasting in both directions, so he also radically departs from it 
by deducing fundamentally different types of simple body from the different types of 
unconstrained motion. Timaeus, on the other hand, despite the incessant circular movements 
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that differentiate his cosmic from almost everything else in the Timaean universe, is free to 
say - and he does say - that the body of the cosmic god consists of the same elements as any 
lesser bodies anywhere. So as far as material constitution is concerned we have an egalitarian 
world. The matter of mortal animals is ‘borrowed from’ the body of the cosmos, and when 
they die the debt is repaid.25 By contrast, when Aristotle thinks of the material of the celestial 
spheres, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that he is always also thinking of its sui generis 
superiority to the materials of things down here. He evidently found it   satisfying to draw 
from his general theory of natural motions the implication that the heavenly bodies are 
possessed of a material constitution that is every bit as perfect as their  perfect spherical form. 
This must have seemed to Aristotle a great advance on the combination, in Plato’s cosmic god, 
of perfect form with gross and common matter. 
 
(12) I have been defending the view that Aristotle’s applying the adjective theia to his celestial 
spheres, and withholding the noun theoi, springs less from a refusal to count them as gods at 
all than from a readiness to see their nature in comparative terms. On this basis I hope not to 
be presuming too much if, for the remaining purposes of this paper, I treat Aristotle’s celestial 
spheres as falling under its title ‘corporeal gods’.26 Well, among the questions we might want 
to raise about these corporeal gods is: given that Plato has so much to say about the great 
cosmic soul, and given that Aristotle’s spheres are clearly living beings,27 why has Aristotle so 
little to say about the souls of the spheres? Perhaps the answer is simply that, on this matter 
at least, he has decided to be much more cautious than Plato. Or perhaps it is because the De 
Anima definition of psuchē as first actuality28 is too weak to account for their incessantly actual 
motion. Or perhaps it is because in De Anima the psuchē is the principle that holds together the 
basic materials of the body in a form, and in arrangements, not natural to them ( a situation 
that only arises for beings whose bodies are made of the sublunary elements). Whatever the 
answer is – these explanations are not mutually exclusive, and others could probably be 
brought in too -  explanations – It is my impression (I wonder, do others share it?) - that 
Aristotle wants to say as little as possible about the psychology of the spheres.  
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26 Further discussion of whether this is justified would address the fact that theologikē is Aristotle’s 
name for the branch of theoretical philosophy that would concern itself with incorporeal substance if 
there is such a thing (Metaphysics references). Is this because he does not (or in the relevant passages 
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(13) However, Metaphysics  Lambda 7 does imply that the beings moved by love of the 
incorporeal god are thereby engaged in noēsis (1072a26 ff.). Its  object or focus is, of course, the 
incorporeal god whose substance is pure activity. What is left completely unexplained is how 
this noēsis  - the  noēsis in which the  celestial spheres are engaged – is related to their 
movement. (In Plato the parallel question about the cosmic god’s intellection and motion is 
less of a mystery. This is because Plato in the Timaeus conceives of the movement of the 
intellect as itself circular even before there is anything corporeal to be visibly moved by it. But 
the idea of a movement which is both non-corporeal and circular is one that Aristotle rejects 
outright.29) One wonders whether Aristotle thinks that the rotations of the spheres are simply, 
as we might say, perfect expressions of their contemplation of the beloved. And, if so, must the 
spheres even be aware of their own movement? Or is awareness of one’s movement 
necessary only for beings who need to take care to guide themselves through contingent 
features of a sublunary environment?  
 
(14) Leaving aside the question of the spheres’ awareness of their own movement, is it 
possible that Aristotle conceives of these circular movements as somehow identical with the 
intellection ascribed to the spheres? We might try to motivate this idea (simply as an idea, 
whether or not we think it feasible to attribute to Aristotle) by the thought that a distinction 
(in physical beings) between intellectual activity and the physical movement expressing it 
makes sense only where the beings in question cannot fully express their thought by their 
physical movement. Our practical thoughts necessarily go beyond anything that anyone else 
can actually see our bodies doing. These practical thoughts are grounded in changing features 
of the external environment, which features may not be apparent to outsiders. Likewise, our 
practical intentions usually – perhaps always – extend to outcomes  whose physical 
constituents, even where they already exist (like the friend whom I mean to help or the object 
I mean to return after borrowing it) may be impossible to identify simply by observing a 
given stage of my physical action. Perhaps it is only this sort of fact that grounds our 
distinction between the external action and the interiority of the thought ‘behind’ it. And 
perhaps we can understand this basis for that distinction in such a way that where there is 
absolutely no room for misinterpreting the thought embodied in a visible action it will seem 
to us that there cannot be even a conceptual, let alone a real, distinction between the thinking 
and the action. 
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(15) Let me return to the topic of the specifically corporeal nature of Aristotle’s corporeal gods. 
We have seen a way in which his theory results in their being more perfectly divine than 
Plato’s cosmic god: this is because their bodies consist of the ethereal fifth substance as 
distinct from the common or garden materials of the Platonic god. But there is a big price to 
pay for this. It means that Aristotle is left with a curiously geometrical as distinct from physical 
notion of the space of the universe. At Physics IV, 212b16-18 he says that everything is ‘in the 
world (ouranos)’, and at 209a31-b1 he speaks of ‘place which is common and in which all 
bodies are’. But his focus here is not really on the fact that everything physical at any given 
time stands in a spatial relation to everything else physical; it is on the fact, as he conceives it, 
that the place of an object strictly speaking is constituted by the surface of the body that 
surrounds it. In other words, the place strictly speaking is precisely not a common space shared 
by many things at the same time. And possibly Aristotle thinks of such a shared space as a 
sort of geometrical abstraction from the shapes and sizes and arrangements of concrete things. 
However that may be, there is a yet stronger notion of the shared space of the world, one that 
Aristotle’s cosmology positively forbids him to entertain. According to this stronger notion, 
any physical object could in principle be or come to be anywhere in cosmic space, and any 
physical object could exchange places with any other of the same size. But in Aristotle’s world 
it is absolutely impossible for anything made of sublunary materials to exchange places with 
any part of any of the celestial bodies. The idea of something from near the centre of the 
universe, or something from the supralunary periphery, following a complete upward or 
downward trajectory from its starting point is, for Aristotle, on the far side of absurd. Because 
different kinds of substances have their different natural ‘homes’, the possibilities of exchange 
of place are extremely narrow, looked from a cosmic perspective. The celestial corporeal gods 
turn out to be just as untouchable by us as any purely spiritual gods could be. And perhaps 
this is the right result if we are serious about their being gods.  But from a modern point of 
view we may find it difficult to be serious about their also being corporeal. If something is 
really a body, how come it’s as impossible that I should kick it or fall into it as (according our 
present views) that I should move faster than light? 
 
(15) Others have – surely at this conference others have had – much more to say on this topic 
than I can cover. And the same goes for the point on which I shall end, which is that Aristotle 
(as it seems to me) is much more effective in doing justice to the unity of the time of the 
cosmos than he is about common space. On the question of time his corporeal gods come to 
his aid. They must be corporeal since time depends on movement; they must engage in 
perfectly continuous and uniform movement since the unity of time depends on this; and 
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they must be made of a perfect, imperishable, divine physical substance in order to ensure 
that time is infinite duration. The all-containing movement of the outermost sphere is what 
maintains the temporal coherence of everything else throught the whole of time. This all-
containing movement would of course be impossible without the incorporeal Prime Mover 
which moves as an object of love. But without the sphere the incorporeal divinity would not 
be what it is, namely Prime Mover and object of cosmic love. Aristotle’s functional pairing of 
these two so-different entities is his version of the idea of a divine power which at every 
instant keeps the world from falling into non-existence. This power is actually a kind of 
duumvirate: one partner does all the divine physical work, and the other is what makes it all 
worthwhile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
